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THE INFLUENCE OF PREVIOUS STRATEGY USE ON 
INDIVIDUALS’ SUBSEQUENT STRATEGY CHOICE:  
FINDINGS FROM A NUMEROSITY JUDGEMENT TASK
Viki SCHILLEMANS, Koen LUWEL, Isis BULTÉ,  
Patrick ONGHENA, & Lieven VERSCHAFFEL
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
We conducted two experiments to test whether individuals’ strategy choices 
in a numerosity judgement task are affected by the strategy that was used on 
the previous trials. Both experiments demonstrated that a previously used 
strategy indeed influences individuals’ strategy choices. Individuals were 
more inclined to reuse the strategy that they had used on the previous trials. 
However, this study also demonstrated that this influence is limited to those 
items that do not have a strong association with a specific strategy. Possible 
underlying mechanisms for the observed effect are discussed.
During the last decades, many studies have shown that people use mul-
tiple strategies to solve a wide range of cognitive tasks. Although this vari-
ability in strategy use has been studied most extensively in the domain of 
arithmetic (e.g., Cooney, Swanson, & Ladd, 1988; Geary & Wiley, 1991; 
Lemaire, Arnaud, & Lecacheur, 2004), it has also been investigated in other 
domains of human cognition such as scientific reasoning (Kuhn, Schauble, 
& Garcia-Milla, 1992), spelling (Rittle-Johnson & Siegler, 1999), reading 
(Goldman & Saul, 1990), decision making (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1988), time telling (Siegler & McGilly, 1989), serial recall (McGilly & Sie-
gler, 1990), currency conversion (Lemaire & Lecacheur, 2001), etc. Besides 
the wide range of tasks in which this strategic variability has been found, 
it is also clear that it is not limited to one specific age group. Indeed, it has 
been found that infants (Adolph, 1995), preschoolers (Geary & Burlingham-
Dubree, 1989), school-age children (Luwel, Verschaffel, Onghena, & De 
Corte, 2000), young adults (Schauble, Glaser, Raghavan, & Reiner, 1991), 
and older adults (Lemaire & Arnaud, 2008) employ several strategies to 
solve a particular task.
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This strategic variability implies that one always has to select a strategy 
for solving a particular problem. It has been found that, already from a young 
age on, people select their strategies quite adaptively, taking into account 
problem, subject, and context characteristics (Siegler, 1996; Verschaffel, 
Luwel, Torbeyns, & Van Dooren, 2009). This adaptivity has widely been 
documented in various task domains. 
An example of the influence of problem characteristics on individuals’ 
strategy choices can be found in the study of Luwel, Verschaffel, Onghena, 
and De Corte (2003a). Using a numerosity judgement task involving a 7 x 7 
grid filled with different numerosities of coloured cells, they found that par-
ticipants used two main strategies to determine the number of coloured cells 
in the grid: (a) an addition strategy, whereby participants added the (groups 
of) coloured cells, or (b) a subtraction strategy, in which the (groups of) 
empty cells were added and then subtracted from the total number of cells in 
the grid. The choice between those two strategies was heavily based on the 
ratio of coloured cells to empty cells in the grid. As a rational task analysis 
would predict, participants used the addition strategy more often on items 
with few coloured cells (and, thus, a lot of empty cells), while the subtraction 
strategy was used more often on items with many coloured cells and few 
empty cells. This was supported by a negative correlation (r = -.92) between 
the percentage use of the subtraction strategy and the number of coloured 
blocks and a positive correlation (r = .92) between the percentage use of the 
addition strategy and the number of coloured blocks. The role of subject 
variables is, for example, examined by Imbo and Vandierendonck (2007). 
Using a mental arithmetic task wherein participants had to solve simple 
addition problems, these authors found an influence of the subject character-
istics processing speed (children with higher processing speed used retrieval 
more frequently than children with lower processing speed), arithmetic skill 
(children with good arithmetic skills chose the retrieval strategy more often 
than children with weaker skills), math anxiety (low-anxious children used 
retrieval more often than high-anxious children), and gender (boys used 
retrieval more frequently than girls) on participants’ strategy choices. An 
example of a study in which the role of a context factor on participants’ 
strategy choices was examined is one by Campbell and Austin (2002), who 
systematically varied the response deadline in a mental arithmetic task. 
These authors observed an increase in the use of the retrieval strategy for 
problems with a large problem size in the condition with a short response 
deadline compared to the condition with a long response deadline. 
A context factor that has hitherto hardly been investigated in current strat-
egy choice research is the effect of people’s strategy use on previous items on 
their current strategy choice. The absence of this context variable in current 
theoretical and empirical research on strategy choice is remarkable, since 
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there is an older line of research in the problem solving literature that has 
already shown that participants’ choice of a solution method is affected by 
the method that was repeatedly used on a series of previous trials. This effect 
has been termed the Einstellung or set effect. In Luchins’ (1942) famous 
study on this effect, two groups of participants solved a series of problems 
in which they had to fill a vessel with a certain amount of water using jars of 
three different sizes. The experimental group received a series of so-called 
‘set items’ that could only be solved by means of the formula B – A – 2C. 
For example, if jar A has a size of 21 units, jar B of 127 units and jar C of 3 
units and the vessel has to be filled with 100 units, then one can remove 21 
units from jar B with jar A and two times 3 units with jar C (i.e., 127 – 21 
– (2 x 3) = 100). After being presented with a series of such problems, par-
ticipants in the experimental group received ‘test items’ which could either 
be solved with the formula B – A – 2C but also via a much simpler one (i.e., 
A – C). An example of such a problem is filling the vessel with 20 units when 
jar A contains 23 units, jar B 49 units and jar C 3 units. Participants in the 
control group, on the other hand, got the test items without being confronted 
with the series of set items. It was found that the experimental group solved 
this test items more often with the complex than with the simpler formula 
compared to the control group. This Einstellung effect has been replicated 
in an alphabet maze task (Cowen, Wiener, & Hess, 1953), consisting of items 
wherein participants had to move from one location to another in a square 
filled with letters by looking for the shortest path consisting of words. After 
a series of trials that could only be solved via a long path, mazes with both 
a long and a short path were offered. It was found that the majority of the 
participants in the experimental group kept on using the familiar long path. 
Also in other domains than problem solving it is found that human behaviour 
can be influenced by what has happened on the previous trials. Epstein and 
Rock (1960), for example, demonstrated that after a series of ambiguous 
figures in which one of the two possible interpretations was more clearly 
pronounced than the other, a following ambiguous figure was more likely 
to be perceived in line with the pronounced interpretation in the previous 
sequence of figures. Starting from the recurrent observation that individuals’ 
behaviour is influenced by what has happened on previous trials, we wanted 
to test the hypothesis that the repeated use of a particular strategy on a series 
of items would have an effect on the following strategy choices.
The present study
The present study comprised of two related experiments in which we 
made use of Luwel et al.’s (2003a) experimental task wherein participants 
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have to determine different numerosities of coloured cells that were pre-
sented in a rectangular grid. As explained above, participants mainly use 
two strategies for solving this task, namely the addition strategy and the 
subtraction strategy. 
We distinguished between two kinds of items in this task: extreme items 
and test items. The extreme items were items which strongly elicited one of 
the two above-mentioned strategies, whereas for the test items it is assumed 
that both strategies are applicable on them. We constructed item sequences 
that consisted of five or six extreme items that all elicited one specific strate-
gy and that were then followed by one test item. We hypothesized that partic-
ipants will choose on the test item more often for the addition strategy when 
this item was preceded by a series of extreme items that all strongly elicited 
the addition strategy than when it was preceded by a series of extreme items 
that all strongly elicited the subtraction strategy. And vice versa, participants 
will more often choose for the subtraction strategy when the item was pre-
ceded by a series of extreme items that all strongly elicited the subtraction 
strategy than when it was preceded by items that strongly elicited the addi-
tion strategy. Furthermore, we expected that this effect would be largest in 
the middle part of the numerosity continuum and would gradually become 
smaller towards the extremes due to an increase in the associative strength 
between each of the two strategies and the numerosities located at both sides 
of this continuum (i.e., the smaller/larger the numerosities, the stronger they 
will elicit the addition/subtraction strategy) (Luwel et al., 2003a). 
In Experiment 1, we wanted to determine the range in which the hypoth-
esized effect of the previous strategy use on the subsequent strategy choice 
could occur. In Experiment 2, we examined this effect in greater detail by 
zooming in on the range of items to which this effect was restricted.
Experiment 1
Method 
Participants
Thirty-one students (28 women and 3 men) in Educational Sciences from 
the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven participated in this study in exchange for 
course credits. Their mean age was 20.3 years (range: 17-48 yrs.).
Material and stimuli
The experiment was run on a portable computer, attached to a 15-inch 
screen with a resolution set to 800 x 600 pixels. Stimuli were rectangular 
grids containing five rows of ten cells each. The grids were presented on a 
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black background and bounded by a red line. Each grid contained 50 cells of 
1 x 1 cm each, which were separated by a thin red line. Each cell was either 
coloured green or remained empty (i.e., it had the same black colour as the 
background). The green cells were located randomly in the grid. 
Two types of items were presented: extreme items and test items. There 
were two kinds of extreme items: (a) addition items that comprised the 
numerosities at the lower end of the numerosity continuum (i.e., 1 to 10) and 
which were known to strongly evoke the addition strategy in adult partici-
pants and, (b) subtraction items that consisted of numerosities at the upper 
end of the numerosity continuum (i.e., 40 to 49) and which strongly evoke 
the subtraction strategy (Luwel, Verschaffel, Onghena, & De Corte, 2003b). 
The test items were five numerosities that were selected at regular intervals 
from the range between the extreme items (i.e., 13, 19, 25, 31, and 37). Six 
different versions were created for each test item by randomly varying the 
position of the green cells in the grid. This was done to avoid that partici-
pants would answer on the basis of their recognition of a previous presen-
tation of the same stimulus instead of actually determining the number of 
coloured cells. 
We created sequences of items that always consisted of a series of five or 
six randomly chosen extreme items of the same kind, followed by one test 
item. This variation in the exact number of preceding extreme items was 
inserted to obscure to some extent the typical sequence pattern that arises 
in this type of experiment. Four different lists containing 30 such sequences 
were generated with the following restrictions: (a) each test item had to be 
included six times; (b) half of the sequences had addition items as extreme 
items, and the other half subtraction items; and (c) half of the sequences 
contained five preceding extreme items, the other half six. Thus, one list 
contained 195 trials in total.
Procedure
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the four lists and were 
then tested individually in a quiet room. Participants were seated about 
40 cm from the screen. Before the start of the experiment five practice tri-
als, which were representative for the whole numerosity range from 1 to 50 
(i.e., 8, 17, 25, 34, and 45), were presented. Participants were instructed to 
determine the number of green cells in each grid as quickly and as accu-
rately as possible. They were also asked to point on the computer screen 
at the type of cells they were counting (i.e., the green cells when they were 
using the addition strategy and the empty cells when they were using the 
subtraction strategy). This enabled the experimenter to determine partici-
pants’ strategy use on each trial. After each practice trial, participants had 
to explain how they had solved that problem. These verbal reports revealed 
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which terms the participants used to describe the addition and subtraction 
strategy; the experimenter noticed these terms and used them in the further 
communication about those strategies. Each trial started with the presenta-
tion of a fixation mark at the centre of the screen, which consisted of five 
white exclamation marks (“!!!!!”) on a black background. After 750 ms, the 
fixation mark was replaced by the stimulus, which stayed on the screen until 
participants had made their numerosity judgement. As soon as participants 
started to pronounce their answer, the experimenter pressed the ENTER-key, 
which cleared the screen. Then the experimenter typed in the given answer 
as well as the type of strategy used, after which the next trial started. Before 
the start of the experimental trials, participants were instructed to use only 
the addition and the subtraction strategy. They were again asked to point 
on the computer screen at the elements they were counting. In contrast to 
the practice trials, they were not asked to describe the strategy they had 
used after every trial. Participants were allowed a short break at three fixed 
moments during the experiment.
Results
Before the analysis, we carried out a manipulation check to assure that 
the extreme items indeed evoked the intended strategy. For both the addition 
and the subtraction items, the intended strategy was used on 2554 of the 2557 
presented items (i.e., on 99.88% of the trials). 
The analyses were only conducted on the test items that were solved cor-
rectly. The following test items were removed from the analysis: (a) test items 
following an extreme item on which an inversion error (i.e., an item on which 
the participant responded with the complement of the actual numerosity plus 
or minus 5, e.g., the participant answered 7 when the correct answer was 
43) occurred (since inversion errors indicate that a mixture of both strate-
gies is used, it is impossible to decide whether the strategy on the test item 
is the same as the previous or not), (b) test items after a sequence in which 
more than one inversion error occurred (since then it cannot be guaranteed 
that participants have been influenced by solely one strategy during that 
sequence). Based upon these criteria, 2 trials were removed from the total of 
823 correctly solved trials (i.e., 0.2%). Missing values were replaced by the 
mean of the other cells of that specific combination of test item and preced-
ing strategy. 
A 5 (numerosity: 13, 19, 25, 31, 37) x 2 (preceding strategy: addition vs. 
subtraction) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the proportion 
subtraction strategy use. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
numerosity, F(4, 120) = 446.40, p < .001, partial η2 = .94, revealing that the 
use of the subtraction strategy increased as a function of numerosity. There 
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was also a significant main effect of the type of preceding strategy, F(1, 30) 
= 9.54, p = .004, partial η2 = .24. As expected, the subtraction strategy was 
used more frequently when the preceding trials were also solved with this 
strategy (M = .45) than when these previous items were solved with the addi-
tion strategy (M = .40). Finally, we also found a significant two-way interac-
tion between numerosity and preceding strategy, F(4, 120) = 2.51, p = .045, 
partial η2 = .08 (see Figure 1). A Tukey test indicated that the effect of the 
preceding strategy use was restricted to numerosity 31 (d = .14, p = .011).
Discussion
The present experiment demonstrated that individuals’ strategy choices 
are influenced by the repeated use of a particular strategy on the preceding 
items. However, this effect was restricted to numerosity 31. At first glance, 
it seems rather surprising to observe this effect on this numerosity and not 
on numerosity 25, the mathematical midpoint of the continuum. This can be 
due to the fact that the subtraction strategy is more complex than the addition 
strategy because it involves an additional step (i.e., subtracting the counted 
cells from the total number of cells) (Luwel et al., 2000), and therefore the 
numerosities around the midpoint of the continuum may still be somewhat 
Figure 1 
Proportion subtraction strategy use as a function of the test item  
and the preceding strategy in Experiment 1.
 
Figure 1 
Proportion subtraction strategy use as a function of the test item and the preceding strategy in 
Experiment 1. 
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more strongly associated with the addition than with the subtraction strategy. 
This is in agreement with the findings of Delvaux (2008) who found that 
most participants chose more often for the addition strategy on the math-
ematical midpoint 25, and only used both strategies to the same extent on a 
numerosity larger than 25. For all other items in this experiment, the associa-
tive strength between the problem features and the respective strategies may 
have been so overwhelming that the expected impact of the context factor 
“previous strategy” was negligible.
Experiment 2
Given the seemingly rather limited range of numerosities on which par-
ticipants’ strategy choices can be influenced as a function of their strategy 
use on the preceding trials, we decided to replicate Experiment 1 on a much 
narrower range of numerosities. This range consisted of the three numer-
osities preceding and following the item on which we observed the biggest 
influence on participants’ strategy choices as a function of their preceding 
strategy use (i.e., 31). As such, this yielded seven test items: 28, 29, 30, 31, 
32, 33, and 34. 
Method
Participants
Twenty-four students (22 women and 2 men) in Educational Sciences from 
the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven participated in this study in exchange for 
course credits. None of them had participated in Experiment 1. Their mean 
age was 19.5 years (range: 17-25 yrs.).
Material and stimuli
The stimuli in this experiment were similar to those in Experiment 1 (i.e., 
coloured cells presented in a 5 x 10 grid). As explained before, the test items 
consisted, of the numerosities between 28 and 34. The extreme items dif-
fered somewhat from those in the previous experiment. At the lower end of 
the continuum, we now used the numerosities 5 to 14, and at the upper end 
the numerosities 36 to 45. By removing the most extreme items (1 to 4 and 
46 to 49), we prevented that participants could solve some trials by subitizing 
the coloured or empty cells instead of actually counting them. Based on the 
results of Experiment 1 on the numerosities 13 and 37, we can assume that 
the chosen numerosities still strongly elicit either the addition or the subtrac-
tion strategy. Since each test item was presented eight times, eight different 
versions were created to avoid that participants could solve the items based 
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on their recognition of a previous presentation of the same stimulus.
Following the same restrictions as in Experiment 1, we created four lists 
of item sequences that always consisted of a series of five or six randomly 
chosen extreme items of the same kind followed by one test item. Since each 
test item was now presented eight times instead of six times as in Experi-
ment 1, each list contained 56 item sequences instead of 30. As such, each 
participant solved 364 trials.
Procedure
The procedure was exactly the same as in Experiment 1.
Results
As in Experiment 1, we executed a manipulation check to test if the 
extreme items indeed evoked the intended strategy. For the addition items, 
this was the case for 3692 of the 3696 presented items (i.e., 99.89% of the 
items), and for the subtraction items, this was the case for 3693 of the 3696 
presented items (i.e., 99.91% of the items). 
Only the test items that were solved correctly were included in the analy-
ses. The same criteria for removing test items as mentioned in Experiment 
1 were used, which led to a data reduction of 5 trials from a total of 1210 
correctly solved trials (i.e., 0.4%). Missing values were replaced by the mean 
of the other cells of that specific combination of test item and preceding 
strategy. 
A 7 (numerosity: 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34) x 2 (preceding strategy: 
addition vs. subtraction) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the 
proportion subtraction strategy use. This analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of numerosity, F(6, 138) = 17.22, p < .001, partial η2 = .43, indicating 
an increase in the use of the subtraction strategy with increasing numeros-
ity. There was also a significant main effect of preceding strategy, F(1, 23) 
= 12.30, p = .002, partial η2 = .35: the proportion subtraction strategy use 
was higher following the use of the subtraction strategy on the preceding 
trials (M = .97) than following the use of the addition strategy (M = .85). 
Finally, the interaction between those two variables was significant, F(6, 
138) = 7.00, p < .001, partial η2 = .23 (see Figure 2). A Tukey test indicated 
that the difference in proportion subtraction strategy use was only significant 
for the numerosities 28 (d = .32, p < .001), 29 (d = .15, p = .007), and 30 (d 
= .13, p = .05). 
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Discussion
As in Experiment 1, we observed that the preceding repeated use of a 
particular strategy has an effect on participants’ subsequent strategy choices. 
Again, this effect remained restricted to a small range of numerosities, 
namely the numerosities between 28 and 30. Given that the largest influ-
ence was found on the first numerosity of the tested range (i.e., 28), it cannot 
be excluded that there would also have been a significant influence on the 
numerosities just below the tested range, such as the numerosities 27 and 26.
General discussion
The present study tested whether individuals’ strategy choices are influ-
enced by their previous strategy use in the context of a numerosity judgement 
task. In both experiments test items that were assumed to be equally well 
solvable by means of an addition or subtraction strategy, were preceded by a 
series of five or six extreme items that were all solved either via the addition 
or subtraction strategy. In Experiment 1, the test items were drawn from a 
Figure 2
Proportion subtraction strategy use as a function of the test item and  
the preceding strategy in Experiment 2
 
Figure 2 
Proportion subtraction strategy use as a function of the test item and the preceding strategy in 
Experiment 2 
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broad numerosity range. The results showed that there was indeed an influ-
ence of the previously used strategy, but the effect was restricted to only one 
of the five tested numerosities. Interestingly, the effect was not observed on 
the test item located in the mathematical middle of the numerosity range 
(i.e., 25) but on the first test item larger than this midpoint, namely 31. In 
Experiment 2, we focused on the range surrounding this numerosity, namely 
28 to 34. The results revealed an influence of previous strategy use on the 
numerosities immediately preceding 31, namely 28 to 30. As such, our stud-
ies have provided convincing empirical evidence that the strategy used on 
previous items may bear an effect on the strategy choice on the current item. 
But, at the same time these results have shown that the influence of this 
context factor is restricted to problems with certain problem features, namely 
problems for which the association with both strategies is more or less the 
same. For the other numerosities, the impact of the proportion of coloured 
(vs. empty) cells is so overwhelming that the effect of the strategy being used 
on the previous items is negligible. 
Although both experiments exhibited an influence of the previous strat-
egy on a small range of test items, the exact results were somewhat different. 
Experiment 1 showed an effect on test item 31, while in Experiment 2 the 
effect was on test items 28 to 30. This slight difference might be attributed 
to differences in subject characteristics between the two samples tested. 
Verschaffel, De Corte, Lamote, and Dherdt (1998) and Delvaux (2008) 
already found large individual differences in associative strength between 
the different numerosities and the two strategies under consideration. Tak-
ing into account the rather small sample size for both experiments (i.e., 31 
participants in Experiment 1 and 24 participants in Experiment 2), similar 
differences might have been present here as well. More specifically, if the 
same set of test items is used for all participants, and if there are (large) 
individual differences in associative strength, then it is possible to observe 
small differences with respect to the kind of items on which an influence of 
a previously used strategy can be observed.
Although we have demonstrated that the repeated application of a par-
ticular strategy has an effect on the subsequent strategy selection process 
for a limited set of items, little is known so far about the mechanism that is 
responsible for this effect. We propose three possible mechanisms that can 
account for the present results. A first mechanism is the occurrence of an 
Einstellung or set effect. The repeated application of one specific strategy 
might have caused a set effect which could have biased participants’ strategy 
selections in the direction of the most recently used strategy. Stated differ-
ently, this set effect could have blinded participants for the possibility of 
applying the other strategy that might have been equally or even slightly 
more efficient for the item at hand. Interestingly, the results of the present 
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study suggest that the occurrence of a possible set effect may be dependent 
on the associative strength between the problem at hand and each strategy. 
As such, this outcome could extend previous findings from the Einstellung 
literature. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, it has never been reported 
that set effects might be moderated by the associative strength between the 
test item and a particular solution strategy (because associative strength was 
not addressed in earlier research on set effects). Take, for instance, Luch-
ins’ (1942) experiments with the water jar problem, where the associative 
strength between the test item and either the complex or the simpler solution 
method assumably remained constant across the different problems that 
were presented as a test item. For instance, consider a test item in which one 
has to arrive at an amount of 20 units with jar A = 23 units, jar B = 49 units 
and jar C = 3 units and another test item with an outcome of 6 units and jar 
A = 14 units, jar B = 36 and jar C = 8 units. Even though the short solution 
method (i.e., 20 – 3 and 14 – 8) is more straightforward than the longer one 
(i.e., 49 – 20 – (2 x 3) and 36 – 14 – (2 x 8)) for both items, there is no rea-
son to assume that one problem would elicit the short solution method more 
strongly than the other one. 
A second possible mechanism that could account for the present find-
ings is priming. This priming mechanism can be conceived as a temporary 
increase in the strength of the last applied strategy, which in its turn will 
increase the probability that this strategy will be chosen on the following 
trial. Thus, on items with which the two strategies are more or less equally 
strongly associated, the primed strategy will slightly be favoured in the 
selection process at the expense of the other. However, on items that are more 
strongly associated with one of the two strategies, the boost in the strength 
of the weaker strategy due to the priming process might not be large enough 
to overcome the existing strength of the stronger strategy. The possibility of 
strategy priming has recently been suggested in Siegler and Arraya’s (2005) 
SCADS* model, which tries to explain how individuals select and discover 
strategies. 
A third possible explanatory mechanism is the so-called strategy switch 
cost. Only very recently, it has been demonstrated that switching from one 
strategy to another entails a cognitive cost that manifests itself in longer 
solution times immediately after having switched from one strategy towards 
another than when repeating the same strategy on two subsequent trials 
(Lemaire & Lecacheur, 2010; Luwel, Schillemans, Onghena, & Verschaffel, 
2009). Maybe participants in the present study tried to avoid this strategy 
switch cost by continuing to apply the same strategy on the test items as 
on the previous sequence of extreme items, even if the problem character-
istics suggest that another strategy would be somewhat more appropriate. 
Arguably, for an item with a very strong associative strength with either 
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the addition or subtraction strategy, the cost of the strategy switch would be 
overwhelmed by the profit of choosing the strategy with the greatest associa-
tive strength. Further research is needed to test which of the aforementioned 
psychological mechanisms underlies the current findings.
Another issue for further research relates to the number and type of pre-
ceding trials that are necessary to evoke the observed influence of previous 
strategy use effect. In both experiments we administered five or six preced-
ing highly extreme items before the test item. This raises two questions for 
further research. First, will this effect also occur if the test item is preceded 
by fewer extreme items, or even after the presentation of a single extreme 
item. And if so, will the effect be as strong as in the current study or will 
it become smaller with a decreasing number of preceding extreme items? 
Second, will we observe a similar effect if participants are presented less 
extreme items, or, stated differently, when they are confronted with a situa-
tion that comes closer to their more “natural” strategic behaviour?
A final question that arises from the present experiments pertains to 
the effect of age on the observed results. The present study included young 
adults as participants. As mentioned earlier, it is known that multiple strat-
egy use is also observed in age groups other than (young) adults. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that the strategy choices in all age groups 
are influenced in the same way by a previously used strategy. Children, 
for example, are known to have less strong associations between specific 
problems and strategies (Siegler, 1996). Therefore, it is possible that they are 
more susceptible to these influences than (young) adults. And what about 
the elderly? It has been shown that people become more rigid as they grow 
older (Lemaire & Lecacheur, 2001), and this rigidity may further strengthen 
their tendency to stick to the strategy being used on previous items. Further 
research is needed to establish the extent to which the current findings are 
moderated by age effects.
To conclude, the present study has provided findings from a numeros-
ity judgement task that document the influence of previous strategy use on 
young adults’ subsequent strategy choices. These findings have implications 
for research on strategy choice in different domains. Indeed, for any study 
wherein individuals are allowed to make strategy choices, one must always 
bear in mind that at least some of these choices could be biased by the strat-
egy that was used before. 
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